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 ﻣﺎو ﺗﺴﻲ ﺗﻮﻧﻎ.""اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﺗﻨﺒﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻮھﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﺪﻗﯿﺔ
"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
Mao Zedong
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Abstract
In South Sudan, people are not engaging in violent altercations because of climate
change. People are not deciding to kill other people because the average temperature of the world
has risen 1 degree celsius, or harming their neighbor because of irregular rain patterns. Alas the
link from climate change to violence is not as direct as that. Rather, climate change has played a
non-direct role in the South Sudanese conflict. Within the political marketplace it has subtly
altered conditions which later spark or intensify outbreaks of violence. Climate change in this
sense should be viewed as a stressor of sorts rather than a direct cause of violence. As will be
described in the first section, climate change places increased stress on the security of food,
health, shelter, and the economy. The increased lack of accessibility combined with the
preexisting political and ethnic tensions that exist in South Sudan’s political marketplace has led
to an exacerbation of violence in the region; this is unlikely to end given the hopeless outlook for
both climate change resolutions and the deeply rooted predisposition to violence which South
Sudan has had since its birth as a nation.
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Introduction
For centuries, generals and political leaders have considered wars and mass violence to
be the most extreme threat to national security. As the world has modernized, this sentiment
slowly seems to be slipping away, especially in light of public sentiment surrounding the threat
of climate change, which very well may become another existential threat should humanity not
change its harmful practices. However, just because one beast rises does not mean the original
monster disappears. In this case, the original monster, war and violence, may actually become
stronger with the additions of the new beast, climate change. This is an interesting argument to
consider, and it makes sense that climate change could create ideal political, economic, and
social instability that could fuel instances of violence around the world.
The topic of climate change has become a hot topic in global politics and media. Climate
change is the local, regional, or global change in average weather that subsequently has impacts
on the world’s biotic and abiotic factors within ecosystems over time. According to NASA,
“Climate… refers to the long-term regional or even global average of temperature, humidity and
rainfall patterns over seasons, years or decades”.1 Climate change includes global warming,
which is the gradual increase in average temperature in a region over time.
The gradual change in global temperatures has been driven largely by anthropogenic
practices including emissions from industries, alterations to natural habitats, and agricultural
practices. As humans continue to alter Earth’s climate, countries are forced to adapt to their
ever-changing climates. Climate change interrupts economic and agricultural practices in

1

Dunbar, Brian. “What Is Climate Change?” NASA, NASA, 13 May 2015,
https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/nasa-knows/what-is-climate-change-k4.html.
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particular, leading to increased strain on political, economic, and social systems that are not
equipped to deal with the drier temperatures, increased natural disasters, and harsher seasons.
Climate change effectively provides an ever looming backdrop to the other political, economic,
and social issues which governments and countries are also confronted with.
One such issue confronting governments around the world is violence. For the purpose of
this paper, violence will be defined according to the World Health Organization’s definition,
stating that violence is, “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual,
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a
high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or
deprivation”. The acts of violence that are especially concerning to governments and political
leaders are those in which multiple people are killed as the result of economic, ethnic, social, or
political differences and disagreements, and include wars, terror attacks, ethnic cleansings,
genocides, and crimes against humanity. These instances are highly covered by media sources,
making them readily accessible for civilian consumers of information and subject to rapid
dissemination.
How can we measure climate change’s influence on violence? Some countries have more
violent incidents while others seem to be at peace. With this in mind, it is better to study the
influence of climate change on violence on a region by region or country by country basis. This
allows for an accurate representation of climate change’s impact on the respective country
without being overwhelmed by data from other countries with dissimilar attributes. South Sudan
has been selected as the country of interest for this study, but why? It is because South Sudan is a
country that has not only experienced high levels of violence in the past decade but has also
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experienced several instances of extreme natural disaster driven by global climate change.
Although the civil war has been prominently featured in international media since its beginning
in 2013, instances of extreme drought and flooding are less common in news sources, but
precipitates political, economic, and social tensions which have fueled the past decade of
violence in the young country.
This paper aims to identify just how strong the relationship between climate change and
violence is in South Sudan. It begins in section 1, which provides background on climate change
globally, in Africa, and in South Sudan specifically. Section 2 provides insight into South
Sudan’s political history of violence. Section 3, on the political theory of violence in Africa, is
included to help describe the nature of the violence and the indirect nature of climate change’s
effect on violence. Finally, section 4 examines the strength of the observed relationship between
climate change and violence, both political and ethnic, in South Sudan.
Ultimately, the conclusion is that in South Sudan, people are not engaging in violent
altercations because of climate change. People are not deciding to kill other people because of a
rise in the average temperature of the world or because of irregular rain patterns. The link from
climate change to violence is not as direct as that. Rather, climate change plays a non-direct role
in South Sudanese conflict, subtly altering conditions which later spark or intensify outbreaks of
violence. Climate change in this sense should be viewed as a powerful and significant stressor
rather than a direct cause of violence.
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Climate Change: A Global and Regional Threat
Climate change is the local, regional, or global change in average weather that
subsequently can have impacts on biotic and abiotic factors within ecosystems over time.
According to NASA, “Climate… refers to the long-term regional or even global average of
temperature, humidity and rainfall patterns over seasons, years or decades”.2 Using resources
such as ice cores and tree rings, scientists have been able to reconstruct what the climate was like
thousands of years ago. The earliest records of the earth’s climate go all the way to 800,000 years
in the past.3 NASA’s and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA)
charts tracking global climate changes, including average surface temperature, average
precipitation, and sea levels, show great changes to each of those factors beginning in the 1800’s.
4

While these changes were previously driven by natural causes, they have been accelerated by

an increase in human development which has subsequently led to an increase in the size of the
post-industrial revolution human population.

2

Dunbar, Brian. “What Is Climate Change?”

3

Dahlman, Rebecca Lindsey and LuAnn. “Climate Change: Global Temperature.” Climate Change: Global
Temperature | NOAA Climate.gov, 15 Mar. 2021,
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature.
4

Dahlman, Rebecca Lindsey and LuAnn. “Climate Change: Global Temperature.”
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It is important to note that the definition of climate change does not include harm done to
the environment by humans. In other words, if the damage does not affect average weather
patterns, then it cannot be called climate change. Such damages would be better suited under the
definition of environmental degradation, which encompasses environmental threats and systems
which harm the environment but do not contribute to climate change.5 Examples of
environmental degradation that do not affect weather patterns include industrial pollution,
overuse of resources, and use of harmful pesticides on crops. Compared to climate change,
environmental degradation is only caused by anthropogenic causes.
Since the industrial revolution, the climate has been changing at an accelerated rate
because modern machines release climate-altering molecules, including carbon dioxide,
methane, and ozone, into the atmosphere.6 Global temperatures are increasing due to the release
of the aforementioned climate altering molecules, also known as greenhouse gases

5

Rinkesh. “Causes, Effects and Solutions to Environmental Degradation.” Conserve Energy Future, 29
June 2020, https://www.conserve-energy-future.com/causes-and-effects-of-environmental-degradation.php.
6
Mann, Michael E. “Greenhouse Gas.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 29 Oct.
2021, https://www.britannica.com/science/greenhouse-gas.
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, into the Earth’s atmosphere.7 These molecules trap the longwave heat radiation that the
earth naturally emits in the atmosphere rather than being released into space, thus warming the
air and subsequently, the Earth’s surface. According to the NOAA, “Averaged across land and
ocean, the 2020 surface temperature was 1.76° F (0.98° Celsius) warmer than the
twentieth-century average of 57.0°F (13.9°C) and 2.14˚F (1.19˚C) warmer than the pre-industrial
period (1880-1900)”.8 This seemingly small rise in temperature has had an extremely detrimental
effect on many ecosystems around the world by damaging both living and non living
components of earth’s natural environment. For example, climate change has led to a sea level
rise of 8-9 inches since 1880, and has placed 1 million species of animals at risk of extinction.9
______________________________________________________________________________

7

Mann, Michael E. “Greenhouse Gas.”

8

Dahlman, Rebecca Lindsey and LuAnn. “Climate Change: Global Temperature.”

9

Lindsey, Rebecca. “Climate Change: Global Sea Level.” Climate Change: Global Sea Level | NOAA
Climate.gov, 7 Oct. 2021,
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level. ; CBS News Editors.
“1 Million Species of Plants and Animals at Risk of Extinction, U.N. Report Warns.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 6
May 2019,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-1-million-animals-plant-species-face-extinction-due-climate-change-humanactivity-population/.
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Figure 110.
This Graphic displays the correlation between average global temperature and carbon dioxide concentrations in the
atmosphere. Carbon Dioxide is a greenhouse gas that traps infrared radiation close to earth's surface. The positive
relationship between the two has driven much of the climate change since industrialization in the 1800’s.

______________________________________________________________________________

10

Berkeley Earth. “Temperature Change vs. Carbon Dioxide Concentration.” Berkeley Earth, 24 Feb. 2021,
https://berkeleyearth.org/dv/temperature-change-vs-carbon-dioxide-concentration/.
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As the threat of climate change continues to grow more intense, scientists have created
tools which allow for the observation and quantification of climate change. One tool often used
to describe the catastrophic levels of climate change is the Doomsday Clock, which was
developed in 1947 as a “metaphorical clock” which would be used to describe the probability of
a global climate driven disaster at a given point in time.11 Each hour on the clock’s face
represents a corresponding level of threat to humanity. For example, while hours 1-6 are
relatively stable and nonthreatening, hours 6-12 grow increasingly more worrisome as the value
of the hour increases. The later hours represent instability and high probability of disaster and
conflict . In Particular, the 12th hour represents an imminent anthropogenic global catastrophe
from which it would be difficult to recover.

11

BBC News Editors. “Doomsday Clock Nears Apocalypse over Climate and Nuclear Fears.” BBC News,
BBC, 23 Jan. 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51213185.
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While the clock was initially used during the Cold War as a means of measuring
likelihood of nuclear war, it has since been converted to a tool to measure the imminent threat of
climate change. As of 2007, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists began to incorporate the dangers of
climate change and environmental degradation into their Doomsday Clock calculations, which
has brought the clock to 5 minutes before midnight.12 On January 23, 2020, the Doomsday Clock
was moved to 100 seconds before midnight because human behavior has increased the
destruction of the environment to an almost irreversible, apocalyptic level.13 The pressing danger
of climate change and environmental degradation has forced the clock to read the closest it has
ever been to midnight.
It has become increasingly clear that climate change threatens human security throughout
the world, especially in those places which are most intensely affected by changes in average
weather and precipitation. When analyzing climate change, threats to individuals and to
communities often go hand in hand. This correlation between people and their communal
security was illustrated in the UN 1994 “Human Development Report” (HDR) definition of
human security.14 The HDR is a document that deals with threats pertaining to individuals and
their communities, especially security risks involving “economic, health, food, environmental,
community, personal, and political” factors.15 Individuals and communities can face serious

12

Ventana al Conocimiento . “The Doomsday Clock, 75 Years Predicting the End.” OpenMind, 27 Aug.
2021,
https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/science/environment/the-doomsday-clock-75-years-predicting-the-end-of-huma
nity/.
13

BBC News Editors. “Doomsday Clock Nears Apocalypse over Climate and Nuclear Fears.”

14

United Nations Development Program. “Human Development Reports | United Nations Development ...”
UNDP, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.
15

United Nations Development Reports Editors. “Human Development Reports.” About Human
Development | Human Development Reports, 22 Nov. 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev.
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health, economic, food, and living risks from climate change because higher quantities of
intense and turbulent weather patterns have threatened the settlements and individuals who
inhabit increasingly at-risk territories. More specific examples are illustrated below:

Health
Individuals are at risk of developing or worsening serious health concerns that can be
amplified or created by anthropogenic pollutants. For example, increasingly severe flood
conditions which are caused by climate change pose a serious threat to human health. Flooding
has the potential to overwhelm infrastructure systems in countries and provinces around the
world. When floods overwhelm the capacity of freshwater that a reservoir or watershed can
handle, it invites the possibility of contamination. Floods can introduce bacteria and germs into
freshwater systems, increasing the risk of people acquiring waterborne illnesses and viruses.
Later in this paper, we will look more specifically at how flood conditions in the Junglei state of
South Sudan contribute to an increased rate of emigration from the state, as continued floods not
only destroyed shelter and water security, but also placed the population at risk of water borne
diseases such as cholera.16

Food and Water

16

Rieckmann, Andreas, et al. “Exploring Droughts and Floods and Their Association with Cholera
Outbreaks in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Register-Based Ecological Study from 1990 to 2010.” The American Journal of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, May 2018,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5953376/.
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Human-driven climate change also threatens individuals’ and communities’ access to
constant and reliable sources of food and fresh water. Modernization of food industries has
enabled the global human population to grow, as increased food production allows for more life
to thrive. As the human population grows over time, it becomes more important to continue to
produce more food and have more fresh water available for people to use for drinking or
agriculture/farming. Providing for a constant food and water supply grows ever more challenging
in light of an increasingly changing climate. For example, drought conditions make it difficult to
produce enough vegetation to grow crops to feed both humans and livestock. In countries where
food production is already low, the increasingly dry conditions not only increase the threat of
starvation but also greatly strain fresh water sources which are needed for drinking water as well.
However, some areas that were once too cold for harvesting may well be able to produce more
when they become warmer.

Shelter
Security also includes having access to shelter, such as a house or other dwelling. This
has also been put at risk due to climate change. There is research that has shown an increased
intensity of natural disasters due to global warming.17 Thousands of people and communities
have been displaced from their homes around the globe because of the increasing intensity of
natural disasters such as tornadoes, mudslides, and floods. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in
2005, approximately 1 million people were displaced from their homes. The intense nature of the

17

UN News Editors. “Climate and Weather Related Disasters Surge Five-Fold over 50 Years, but Early
Warnings Save Lives - WMO Report | | UN News.” United Nations, United Nations, 1 Sept. 2021,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1098662.
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storm compared to previous storms that had affected the region also killed almost 1,000 people
in the state of Louisiana alone. Many American people were left with destroyed homes or
without their essential belongings due to the destructive storm and were forced to live in
crowded public shelters until new secure housing arrangements could be made. To this day, parts
of Louisiana are still recovering from Katrina. Security and peace created by the possession of
shelter are obviously put at risk due to the intense nature of such disasters.
Hurricane Sandy in 2012 caused approximately 60 billion dollars in damage and took the
lives of approximately 125 people while also severing power to 7 million American households.
18

Hurricane Sandy in particular is indicative of the growing threat of climate change because not

only was the scale of the storm intense, but it also affected a region of the US, the Northeastern
seaboard, which is not usually hit by hurricanes. Thus, the buildings and homes were not
equipped to withstand the strong storm surges, causing destruction that displaced thousands from
their homes.19

Economy
Basic human security has evolved to also include security of the economy. This means
that human security relies on access to a marketplace to sell and acquire goods and services in
order to finance one's livelihood. Although a comfortable and healthy livelihood differs from
geographic region to geographic region, we can basically understand it as having access to

18

Cappucci, Matthew. “Climate Change Boosted Hurricane Sandy's Damage by $8 Billion, Study Finds.”
The Washington Post, WP Company, 19 May 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/05/19/hurricane-sandy-climate-change-damages/.
19

Cappucci, Matthew. “Climate Change Boosted Hurricane Sandy's Damage by $8 Billion, Study Finds.”
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markets, having goods and services to purchase and sell, and having a stable and secure economy
(meaning one’s livelihood won’t suddenly disappear). The increasing rate of global climate
change has placed increased stress on healthy economies around the world. Climate change alters
natural resource accessibility, which subsequently alters the ability of individuals to produce
goods and services which are sold within a marketplace.
An example of this are the recent events seen in California. In 2017, Napa Valley in
Northern California suffered tremendous losses to its wine industry when huge wildfires
destroyed acres of vineyards and stores of wine. The wildfires were more intense in 2017 due to
the severe drought conditions throughout California as a whole. The surplus of overdried
landscape made for perfect wildfire conditions, and wildfires destroyed upwards of 50 million
dollars of the valuable Napa Valley wine industry.20
Similarly, coastal fishing towns in the gulf of Mexico are facing an increased scarcity of
healthy fishing waters. Not only does this threaten the population’s access to a stable food supply
from the ocean but it also threatens the communities’ ability to financially support themselves, as
many rely on large fishing hauls to sell at domestic markets and abroad. The increasingly
unhealthy waters in the Gulf of Mexico have been called the “Dead Zone”, and data shows that
unnaturally warm waters in combination with anthropogenic pollution (not climate change) have
lead to generously low oxygen levels in the Gulf, leading to a lack of oxygen for marine
organisms, such as fish, to use in order to survive.21 Thus, fish populations and coastal

20

Flavelle, Christopher. “Scorched, Parched and Now Uninsurable: Climate Change Hits Wine Country.”
The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 July 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/18/climate/napa-wine-heat-hot-weather.html.
21

The Nature Conservancy Editors. “Gulf of Mexico Dead Zone.” The Nature Conservancy, 22 Nov. 2021,
https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/where-we-work/priority-landscapes/gulf-of-mexico/stories-in-the-gulf-of-me
xico/gulf-of-mexico-dead-zone/.
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populations have both been devastated as climate change continues to threaten their security of
economy, health, and food.22

______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 2.23

22

Lee, Elizabeth. “'Dead Zone' Threatens Livelihood of Gulf of Mexico Fishermen.” VOA, 'Dead Zone'
Threatens Livelihood of Gulf of Mexico Fishermen, 24 June 2019,
https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_dead-zone-threatens-livelihood-gulf-mexico-fishermen/6170500.html.
23

Gough, Evan. “According to NASA, 2019 Was the Second Hottest Year on Record.” Universe Today, 20
Jan. 2020, https://www.universetoday.com/144652/according-to-nasa-2019-was-the-second-hottest-year-on-record/.
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This figure shows the increase in temperature that almost all of the world has experienced since the 1951-1978
baseline. This is indicative of a rapidly changing climate in the past 60 years that negatively affects biotic and
abiotic organisms and systems all around the world.

______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 3.24
This figure shows changes in precipitation compared to historic averages. Note that a lot of landmass, specifically
between 30 degrees North and 30 degrees South, experience a decrease in precipitation compared to the past. Such
changes are detrimental to natural habitats and also to human activity such as agriculture and farming.

______________________________________________________________________________

24

Penn State. “Climate Change Predictions.” Climate Change Predictions | EARTH 103: Earth in the
Future, 2021, https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth103/node/902.
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Climate Change in Africa
Both human security and environmental stability are impacted by climate change globally
as well as regionally. The case in Africa is no different. The 2019 State of Climate in Africa
report highlighted the impending threats to human security and economics in Africa in light of
growing environmental changes.25 The World Meteorological Organization summarized their
findings by remarking that, “Temperatures in Africa have been rising in recent decades at a rate
comparable to that of most other continents and thus somewhat faster than global mean surface
temperature, which incorporates a large ocean component. The year 2019 was among the three
warmest years on record for the continent. Annual rainfall exhibited sharp geographical contrasts
in 2019, with totals remarkably below long-term means in Southern Africa and west of the High
Atlas Mountains and above-average rainfall recorded in other areas, in particular in Central and
East Africa… This is more than the average global sea-level rise of 3–4 mm per year.... Africa
was severely hit by extreme weather and climate events in 2019... Tropical Cyclones Idai and
Kenneth resulted in severe humanitarian impacts, including hundreds of casualties and hundreds
of thousands of displaced persons... The areas most severely affected by drought in 2019 were in
Southern Africa and were many of the same areas that were also affected by a protracted drought
in 2014–2016. In contrast, a dramatic shift in conditions was experienced in the Greater Horn of
Africa, from very dry conditions in 2018 and most of 2019 to floods and landslides associated
with heavy rainfall in late 2019.”26

25

ECA Editors. “State of the Climate in Africa 2019 Report.” State of the Climate in Africa 2019 Report |
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 26 Oct. 1970,
https://www.uneca.org/events/african-climate-policy-centre/state-climate-africa-2019-report.
26

WMO Editors. “Multi-Agency Report Highlights the Current and Future State of the Climate in Africa.”
World Meteorological Organization, 26 Oct. 2020,
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/multi-agency-report-highlights-current-and-future-state-of-climate-afr
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Furthermore, the report emphasizes the importance of agriculture within African society.
The author writes, “Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s economy and accounts for the
majority of livelihoods across the continent. Africa is therefore an exposure and vulnerability
“hot spot” for climate variability and change impacts. Projections under the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)...suggest that warming scenarios ...have devastating effects on
crop production and food security.”27
It is clear from the report’s findings that the criteria laid out in the UN’s 1994 “Human
Development Report” definition of human security are all at stake, for not only are food and
fresh water supply at risk due to erratic precipitation levels, but shelter and health are also at risk
due to increased severity of natural disasters, which not only destroy structures and infrastructure
but can also cause physical harm to inhabitants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ica?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%2Bwmo%2FapqD%2B%28World%
2BMeteorological%2BOrganization%2BNews%29.
27

WMO Editors. “Multi-Agency Report Highlights the Current and Future State of the Climate in Africa.”
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Figure 4.28
Regional temperatures have risen compared to past decades. This is in part due to the release of natural and (mainly)
anthropogenic greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere which raise temperatures around the world. Even Though
Africa does not pollute as much as other continents, atmospheric circulation pushes greenhouse gasses around the
globe so that they affect the entire world.

______________________________________________________________________________

28

Research Gate Editors. Temperature Trends for the Arctic , 2021,
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Temperature-trends-for-the-Arctic-showing-a-the-annual-surface-temperature-tr
ends-over_fig2_222911133.
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Figure 5.29
This figure includes four different maps which show changes in temperature and precipitation in Africa specifically.
Overall, temperatures have risen across the continent and precipitation has increased in the north, and decreased in
the south.

29

World Meteorological Organization. “State of the Climate in Africa.” State of the Climate in Africa 2019,
2019, https://etrp.wmo.int/pluginfile.php/44778/mod_resource/content/1/ClimAdap_session5_JVazquez.pdf.
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Figure 6.30
This graphic from the World Meteorological Organization shows the total number of internally displaced people
from countries across the globe as a result of increased rates of climate disasters. Sudan and South Sudan in
particular are among those countries which experience the most displaced peoples as a result of an increasingly
changing climate.

30

World Meteorological Organization. “State of the Climate in Africa.” State of the Climate in Africa 2019,
2019, https://etrp.wmo.int/pluginfile.php/44778/mod_resource/content/1/ClimAdap_session5_JVazquez.pdf.
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Climate Change in South Sudan
South Sudan is a sub-Saharan, land-locked African country that borders Sudan, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. South
Sudan’s geographic location is highly vulnerable to climate change, including flooding, droughts
and, most recently, a locust infestation (due to warming changing climate conditions that
promote the reproduction of locusts).31The changes to climate over time affect personal security
in South Sudan by decreasing access to stable sources of food, fresh water, shelter, and healthy
living conditions.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on Climate Change in South Sudan,
the country is, “ experiencing the effects of long-term climate change, such as increased
temperatures and precipitation change, as well as short-term changes, like more frequent
droughts and floods”. 32 This aligns with the general climate change trends seen in Africa as a
whole in recent years.

31

World Bank Group Editors. “World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal.” Summary | Climate
Change Knowledge Portal, 22 Nov. 2021, https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/south-sudan. ;
ACCORD. “Climate, Peace and Security: The Case of South Sudan - South Sudan.” ReliefWeb, 24 Mar. 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/climate-peace-and-security-case-south-sudan. ; Stalon, Jean-Luc.
“Confronting Climate Change in South Sudan | Africa Renewal.” United Nations, United Nations, 29 June 2017,
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/confronting-climate-change-south-sudan.
32

Yaw Tchie, Andrew E. “Climate, Peace and Security: The Case of South Sudan.” NUPI, 24 Mar. 2021,
https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Climate-Peace-and-Security-The-case-of-South-Sudan.
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Temperature:
Mean annual temperatures across South Sudan have varied between 26˚C (79 degrees fahrenheit)
and 32˚C (90 degrees fahrenheit) over the past 30 years, with an increase of 0.4˚C every decade.
33

The average temperature is projected to increase between 1˚C and 1.5˚C by 2060, leading to a

warmer and drier climate.34

Precipitation:
In the last 20 years, rainfall in South Sudan has been erratic, and swings between heavy and
light rainfall within a given season. For example, “summer rainfall has decreased by 15–20 per
cent, particularly in the north-east, whereas other regions experienced flooding in 2019”.35 In
2019 alone, flooding displaced hundreds of people from their homes due to heavy rainfall during
the wet season. This directly harmed crop yields for 2019, contaminated fresh water sources,
destroyed homes, and injured and killed many citizens.36 As climate change continues to increase
due to increased anthropogenic emissions, one can expect to see these instances of abnormal
weather patterns increase and further threaten security and stability within South Sudan.
South Sudan’s security of shelter, food and water, health, and economy face increased
threat due to climate change, and these will be addressed sequentially.
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Shelter
South Sudan naturally experiences a wet and a dry season, so heavy rainfall during the
wet season is no surprise to the people living there. However, climate change has increased the
intensity of instances of heavy rainfall in recent years. Globally, wet seasons, tropical storms,
hurricanes, and heavy rainfall have become more intense, and have been characterized by record
breaking rainfall, with more severe dry seasons and droughts breaking up the wet seasons.37
South Sudan is no exception to this trend. In the last decade, the region has suffered extreme
swings in climate, changing from extreme drought to extreme precipitation in a very short time
period. Floods in particular provide great threat to the security of shelter in South Sudan, as
structures, homes, and roads were not built to accommodate the extremely heavy downpours,
flash floods, and lasting floods which have occurred with frightening frequency since 2012.38 As
many as 1 million people have been affected by the floods, with thousands of people being
displaced from their homes due to water damage, the growth of flood zones, and the increased
area of land which has been ruined due to waterlogged soil. In particular, the lands surrounding
the West Nile River have faced increased threat to shelter security as intense flooding continues
to overwhelm infrastructure and ruin homes.39
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Figure 7.40
This map shows the climatic zones of south sudan. The country is climatically diverse, having natural wetlands, arid
deserts, regions with hills, and also jungles.

______________________________________________________________________________
Food and Water
Food and Water security has also faced increased threat due to climate change, and,
similar to the security of shelter, has been greatly influenced by extreme flooding. This has been
offset to some extent by extreme drought conditions in the dry season. Floods throughout South
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Sudan harm the health of the naturally fertile soils near the West Nile, as the soil becomes
waterlogged and thus loses the ability to be as productive as it was in years before the
intensification of climate change.41 Floods also destroy existing agricultural fields as the rising
water levels wash away crops during especially heavy rainfall.
In addition to extreme floods, South Sudan’s food supply is threatened by the increasing
frequency of extreme drought periods between wet seasons has also shattered the security of
food not only for the people of South Sudan but also for their livestock. Droughts that dried up
previously arable soil have also dried out areas of the sizable grasslands surrounding the Nile
River.42 The shrinking area has led to less land for cattle to graze on, which has resulted not only
in a lack of food for the cattle to graze on but also a reduction in the size of herds that pastoral
populations are able to keep.43
As crops and cattle continue to be threatened by an ever changing climate, food
insecurity in South Sudan continues to intensify. As of 2019, an estimated 6 million people faced
acute food insecurity and required outside assistance in order to procure a stable source of food,44
accounting for approximately 51% of South Sudan’s 11.7 million population!45 Unfortunately,
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this figure is projected to increase as climate change will only continue to destroy stable food
sources.

______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8.46
This graphic touches on food insecurity in South Sudan and Around South Sudan. Compared to other countries in
the sub saharan region, South Sudan experiences the worst food insecurity.

______________________________________________________________________________
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Health
One of the main threats to health security in South Sudan are the increasing rates of
famine and malnutrition across the country which are exacerbated by the increasingly intense
periods of flooding and drought. The health threat of floods does not end at the destruction of
shelter and the presence of food and water insecurity. South Sudan has also faced increasing rates
of cholera during seasons of extreme flooding in the country. According to Andreas Reikmann
et. al.’s study on cholera in Sub Saharan Africa, “Floods may contribute to cholera outbreaks in a
number of ways. Floodwaters can overflow sanitation systems and contaminate the environment
and water sources. In addition, they may impede access to safe water sources or sanitation
facilities”.47 This is precisely how cholera cases continue to rise in South Sudan. The extreme
floods contaminate the freshwater stores of populations in and around the flooding zones, leading
to the unknowing consumption of contaminated water. Cholera is not the only disease to linger in
contaminated watersheds. Other diseases such as dysentery, hepatitis A, typhoid, and polio are
also known to exist in South Sudan’s contaminated water.48 These cases place increased stress on
South Sudan’s underequipped and underfunded healthcare system, which struggles to not only
address these cases which do not exist in more developed countries, but also to address rising
levels of malnutrition.

47

Rieckmann, Andreas, et al. “Exploring Droughts and Floods and Their Association with Cholera
Outbreaks in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Register-Based Ecological Study from 1990 to 2010.” The American Journal of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, May 2018,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5953376/.
48

The Last Well Editors. “The Current State of Contaminated Water-Related Diseases in Africa.” The Last
Well, 29 Mar. 2019,
https://thelastwell.org/2019/03/the-current-state-of-contaminated-water-related-diseases-in-africa/.

Menard, 33
______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9.49
This graphic shows the reported cases of Cholera in South Sudan over time in relation to the total rainfall in South
Sudan over time. This graphic is particularly important because it shows that with almost every rise in rainfall, there
is a corresponding rise in cholera. This is because increased rainfall due to climate change can overwhelm South
Sudanese infrastructure such as natural watersheds and water purifying centers, causing contamination to fresh
water.
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Economy
Lastly, economic security faces increased stress due to climate change. As previously
mentioned, flooding and droughts have greatly threatened the pastoral and agricultural industries.
These industries make up 15% of South Sudan’s national GDP, and a large majority of South
Sudan’s population engages in agricultural, pastoral, or fishing industries.50 A threat to any one
of these industries via drought or flood affects the rest, especially as arable and grazeable land
becomes all the more scarce.
South Sudan’s main exports include gold (70 % total exports), livestock (25%), oil,
arabic gum and cotton.51 While oil and gold are not resources that are greatly affected by climate
change, livestock, cotton, and arabic gum are all exports which are included in the agricultural
and pastoral activities which are disrupted by intense drought and flood seasons, thus greatly
hindering South Sudan’s economy not only on a domestic but also a global scale.
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Figure 10.52
This graphic breaks down the major industries within South Sudan. It is notable that a vast majority of people
engage in farming or pastoral occupations, which are extremely vulnerable to changes in climate.
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Figure 11.53
Figure 11 further emphasizes the changes in precipitation and temperature in south sudan compared to historic
averages. These changes are especially detrimental to farmers, fishermen, and pastoralists who depend on stable
climates in order to continue producing stable outputs to sell.
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Figure 12.54
This map shows soil anomalies in South Sudan’s soil for the year 2019. Areas that are green show that they are more
moist than average while red areas show drier conditions. For 2019, South Sudan experienced both drier conditions
and wetter conditions, which were detrimental to vulnerable industries and populations.

______________________________________________________________________________
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South Sudan: a New State Built on a Foundation of Violence and Instability
South Sudan is a northeastern, land-locked African country that borders Sudan, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. South
Sudan’s capital is Juba. However, prior to 2011, the territory now known as South Sudan was a
part of Sudan. Thus, many of South Sudan’s current political, economic, and cultural problems
are remnants of the country's ties to Sudan proper and its other neighbors.55 The government of
South Sudan was created as a republic, though civil war has disrupted the legal and
administrative systems of the country. Culturally, the country has a predominantly Christian or
animist background, which differs from the largely Muslim culture of Sudan.56
Furthermore, since its formal birth in 2011, South Sudan’s short yet turbulent history has
been defined by recurring instances of violence, caused not only by the ruling politicians but
also by the complex historical, economic, and cultural differences between neighboring groups in
the country. Before being able to identify and assess the impact that climate change has on
violence within the country, it is important to understand the very nature of the violence that is
occurring. Only then will we be able to untangle the overlapping causes of violence to see how
large of a role, if any, climate change plays in the longevity and degree of violence in South
Sudan.
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History Prior to 2011
To fully understand the causes of violence in South Sudan, one must understand the
conflicts that have existed within the territory far longer than 2011, even those preceding the
colonization of the South Sudanese territory.

Pre-Colonialism
The majority of people of South Sudan are Christian in faith, or follow regional African
religions. There exist several ethnic groups within the territory of South Sudan, but the two main
ethnic groups are the Dinka and the Nuer. The Dinka makeup
makeup

of the population and the Nuer

of the population. The rest of the population can be broken down into minority groups

which include the Anwak, Bari, Shilluk, and Zande.57
The Dinka are dispersed throughout the country and are typically cattle herders by
profession. The Nuer, on the other hand, have settled through the central/northeastern part of the
country. The Nuer are typically farmers by trade.58

Colonial Ties
The territory now known as South Sudan was brought under British Mandate in the 1899
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.59 The mandate gave Sudan (which included South Sudan at the
time) to the Egyptian and British regimes to rule. However, as the British had colonized Egypt,
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the British had a far heavier influence on colonial Sudan than the Egyptian government.
Beginning in 1899, the British deployed forces to pacify the local religious uprisings which were
occurring all across the country.60 These conflicts were mainly Muslim versus Christian in
nature, which naturally pitted the northern Muslim/Arab leaning population against the Christian
south.
By 1900, the north of Sudan was largely under the control of the British mandate with
few uprisings remaining. This allowed the British to begin modernizing the country both
economically and politically. The south, however, which included modern day South Sudan, was
not so easily quelled. Resistance to British governance was far more intense and took place over
the entire British imperial rule in Sudan, approximately 57 years. This greatly impaired the
British ability to modernize the south, as their efforts were focused more on peace-keeping than
on modernization of institutions and the economy. The lasting effects of the 1900 revolts in south
Sudan are apparent, and further increased the divide between the north and the south, for as the
north became more modern and western, the south remained comparatively stagnant, lacking any
sort of political, cultural, or economic advancement. This created resentment and tension
between the north and south, which further fueled desires for separation within South Sudanese
nationalist groups.61
Furthermore, in the decades between 1900 and 1947, the British colonizers made the
decision to segregate the Christian Africans of the south from the Muslim Arabs of northern
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Sudan. This physically set the two cultural identities apart, leaving the Muslim population in the
modernized north and the Christian population in the unstable south.62
The British were able to maintain peace within Sudan until the end of World War II in
1945. While the British were fighting the war in Europe, members of the educated Sudanese
upper class elite created the first nationalist groups, such as the Graduate’s General Congress,
which included both moderate and radical members bound together by their nationalist ideas for
Sudan.63 The Graduate’s General Congress became the first political party in Sudan. The British
administration tried to accommodate Sudanese cries for self determination by allowing for more
Sudanese participation in administrative offices and positions of leadership. In 1947, the British
also decided to abolish the longstanding segregation that had lasted nearly half a century between
the Muslim Arab North and the Christian African South, allowing for a legislative council in
which Arabic was decreed as the national language, not English, much to the south’s discontent.
The institution of Arabic as the national language limited the ability of the south to participate in
the government, thus further marginalizing Christian Africans and adding further stress between
the territory of the north and south.64
In 1953, the Egyptian and British governments signed an agreement which granted Sudan
self determination and self government within three years. In November of 1953, two political
parties faced off in the first elections for a representative parliamentary government: the National
Unionist Party, led by the charismatic and Egyptian-favored Isma’il al-Azhari, and the Ummah
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party.65 Azhari won the election in an overwhelming victory, which ultimately served to further
oppress the southern territories under the domination of the modernized north. Southerners were
given little representation within Azhari’s government, thus furthering public discontent in the
south towards the new republican government.66

Post Colonial period
In 1955, several military troops stationed in Torit, a city in the south, mutinied after
refusing to relocate to Khartoum, a city in the north. While the mutiny was quickly quashed by
the northern government, the discontent and agitation of the south against the north proved
pervasive, and continued despite Azhari’s efforts to pacify the southern territory. Over time, the
southern resistance became more organized, leading to increased armed violent attacks against
the north. These attacks were fueled by southern Sudanese nationalist sentiment, and a strong
desire to be separate from the Muslim north’s government, which had failed to adequately
represent the Christian African south.67
In 1956, Sudan was declared a republic, but the democratic processes were short lived.
By 1958, the government was under the control of General Irahim Abbud, who commanded the
Sudanese army. All political parties were dissolved under his leadership, and while his reign
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momentarily boosted the economy, Abbud was unable to take hold in the disparaged south,
which was still waging an armed conflict against the government of the north.68
Dissatisfaction with the north led to a series of political strikes and even a coup. All of
these events still failed to give southern Sudan equal representation in the eyes of the national
government.69 The violence continued, and the south Sudanese rebels were reorganized in 1971
under General Joseph Lagu, who was also the head of the South Sudan Liberation Movement
(SSLM).70 Under his leadership, channels of discourse and negotiation were opened between the
northern government and the southern rebellion. The talks between the two groups resulted in the
Addis Ababa Agreement in Feb 27, 1972, which granted increased autonomy for the southern
region, granting it its own separate legislature and executive body within the Sudanese
government as a whole.71 The agreement temporarily satisfied the demands of the SSLM, and
allowed for increased development in the south due to the ceasefire between the government and
rebels.
By the 1980’s. however, the civil war between the north and south resumed, in part due to
the addition of the Muslim Brotherhood into Sudanese politics. The Brotherhood’s Muslim
policies alienated the south yet again, thus sparking violent clashes between the two groups,
mainly along religious lines.72 The violence escalated, and was followed by a series of military
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coups, each led by a military leader who sought to increase their own personal power and
influence within Sudan, often utilizing violent means at the expense of the rebels in the south.73
Violence continued between the north and south for decades without a resolution until the
early 2000s, when it seemed peace could finally be achieved. In 2005, the north and south of
Sudan were able to reach a peace agreement.74 By 2011, South Sudan voted to become an
independent nation, completely separate from Sudan as a whole. Finally, after decades of
violence and an estimated 1.5 million deaths, it seemed as though the southern Christian and
traditional African population would have a peaceful state of their own.75

The Birth of Sudan: 2011
In 2011, South Sudan was created after a referendum. An overwhelming majority of
people voted in favor of the creation of an independent state, thus leading to the creation of a
republic (as enumerated in the 2011 transitional constitution). The government was structured
with an executive head, the president, and with a vice president, who is appointed by the
president. Legislative power was bicameral.The political parties that contributed to the seats
within both legislative bodies were elected from political parties, including the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM), the majority party in South Sudan, and others, including the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–Democratic Change (SPLM–DC), Union of Sudan
African Parties (USAP), Sudan African National Union (SANU), the South Sudan Democratic
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Forum (SSDF), and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). The constitution also laid
out the creation of 10 states within South Sudan, which would balance regional power between
them.76

Economic Issues
Upon independence, South Sudan was quick to assert its newfound liberation by
replacing the Sudanese pound with its own currency, the South Sudanese Pound. The transition
period was extremely unstable, as many South Sudanese communities were still using old
Sudanese pounds, which were an outdated currency that held little value.77 The heightened
concerns of economic instability were only exacerbated by the continued issues with borders
regarding the oil industry. After the partition, South Sudan found itself still using pipelines that
technically belonged to Sudan, which was charging high fees for the usage. Sudan also began to
confiscate portions of South Sudan’s oil as “fees” for the use of the pipelines.78
In South Sudan, the oil economy contributes greatly not only to economic stability but
also political stability. The state generated significant profits off of the export and sale of oil.79 To
have Sudan continue to contest South Sudan's independence by interfering with their oil
production further exasperated the domestic and international stability of the country.
Furthermore, in addition to oil skirmishes, Sudan and South Sudan continued to argue over
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border demarcation, which drew the fledgling government’s attention away from domestic needs.
Ultimately arguments over the border became violent, and the UN had to step in and officiate the
demarcation of borders between the two countries.80
______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 13.81
This figure shows some of the territorial regions which Sudan and South Sudan contest over.
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South Sudanese Civil War: December 2013-February 2020
In the midst of facing continued economic issues, ethnic violence escalated between the
Nuer and Dinka peoples. The conflict between them mainly focused around cattle ranching
disputes over grazeable territory which led to a series of attacks between the two groups which
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resulted in the deaths of upwards of 1,500 people and displaced more than 10,000 people from
their ancestral homes shortly after the 2011 referendum.82
On top of the ethnic violence surrounding cattle ranching, party politics began to show
signs of increased ethnic tension shortly after the independence of South Sudan, specifically
between the majority party, the SPLM, and its political rivals. The President of South Sudan,
Salva Kiir Mayardit, was elected following the referendum and belonged to the SPLM party. Kiir
is also Dinka in ethnicity.83 In 2013, he dismissed his presidential cabinet, including his vice
president, Riek Macchar, who had been appointed by Kiir in 2011. Riek Macchar is Nuer in
ethnicity.84
At the same time, Machar began to articulate his ambitions to challenge Kiir for SPLM
leadership, as well as his desire to be the party’s presidential candidate in the country’s 2015
elections. The political tensions became violent in December of 2013, when gunshots were
exchanged between Kiir’s and Machar’s troops.85 Kiir claimed that the violence was caused by
Machar’s failed coup to take over the government. At the same time, Machar claimed the
violence was caused by Kiir in an attempt to eliminate political rivals.86
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In the wake of the violent exchange, Machar emerged as the leader of the SPLA in
Opposition (SPLA-IO), and their goal was to overthrow Kiir as a president.87 The divisions
between the two leaders were initially political in nature. However, over time, the violence
evolved into an ethnic conflict too The political conflict set Kiir’s ethnic group, the Dinka, and
Machar’s ethnic group, the Nuer, against each other, thus spreading the violence beyond political
actors and into the civilian realm.88 Civilians began killing each other, spurred on by their
respective political leaders. The violence intensified to an extreme extent, killing hundreds and
displacing thousands. Both sides have been accused of human rights violations.89
The violence between the Dinka and the Nuer did not come as much of a surprise, as the
two ethnic groups had been historic rivals, rooted in agricultural versus pastoral practices, which
eventually evolved into political competition for power.90 The SPLM army is claimed to have
carried out pogroms against the Nuer, as the army is largely Dinka in ethnicity. Attempts at
localized mediation efforts did not make any progress in creating a lasting peace between the two
political parties, and thus made no progress in calming the tensions between the two ethnic
groups.91 Several cease-fire agreements were signed, but they were quickly tossed away as
ethnic-based fighting continued.92 The violence reached such heights that the 2015 democratic
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elections for the executive office and legislative seats had to be postponed, which allowed Kiir to
continue his executive rule over South Sudan. Kiir was later granted a constitutional extension of
his term by the legislative branches.93 This very extension of his political power increased
polarization between the SPLM and the SPLM-IO.
While Kiir and Machar continued to wage war against each other, the lives of civilians
became increasingly disrupted. By January 2015, an estimated 10,000 were dead, and
approximately 2 million people were displaced in only 12 months.94 A 2014 drought which
spurred a famine also placed increased stress on the lives of civilians and soldiers alike, as
resources became increasingly scarce.95 Farming and pastoral practices had also been interrupted
by fighting, which prevented a stable food supply.
In August 2015 Machar and Kiir signed another peace deal. Kiir was to remain as
president and Machar was to return to his position as the vice president. However, the peace did
not last long, and fighting between the two groups eventually erupted again. The issue which was
particularly problematic between the two groups was Kiir’s movement to increase the number of
states from 10 to 28.96 This change would essentially gerrymander votes in favor of Kiir, while
dividing opposition forces across official state lines, and would completely disrupt the delicate
balance of power between the original 10 states. When the policy was implemented and
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enforced, any semblance of security that had been created post 2011 referendum was destroyed.97
Political leaders scrambled to collect as much political and economic influence as they could
since a power vacuum was left in the wake of the new state creation. This led to small-scale
violent skirmishes between the borders of the new states as power and influence were disputed.
In March 2016 the United Nations issued a report describing their findings of widespread
human rights abuses throughout the young country which had been perpetrated by both the
SPLM and the SPLM-IO, and between the Dinka and Nuer. The UN cited the
government-aligned forces as having been responsible for the majority of the human rights
violations against other soldiers and civilians since the beginning of the conflict in 2013.98 To be
sure, the civilian population suffered due to the disputes between two political parties. The
violence endured by the civilian population included mass killing, sexual violence against
women, targeting of hospitals and peacekeeping missions, and the systematic destruction of
opposition towns and villages.In the report, the UN ultimately declared the actions on both sides
of the violence as crimes against humanity.99
Since its beginning in 2013, over 7 million people (approximately two thirds of the
population ) have been placed in desperate need of aid, with about 6.9 million of the 7 million
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people experiencing hunger.100 As the conflict continued past 2015 and into the late 2010s, an
estimated 7.7 million people faced crisis levels of hunger due to food insecurity, economic
instability, and ongoing violence against civilians.101 Harvests became less productive and food
stores dried up over the span of the conflict. Millions were pushed to the brink of starvation for
years as resources continued to dwindle. In 2017, famine was declared in two states in South
Sudan.102 The disruption of humanitarian and intervention allowed for a prolonged state of
conflict and insecurity which has not been resolved between Kiir and Machar even up until 2020.
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Figure 14.103
Vice President Machar (Left) and President Kiir (Right) shaking hands at the 2016 peace conference, which later
failed.
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Figure 15.104
This figure from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies shows the levels of need of Humanitarian Assistance in
South Sudan in relation to the number of refugees and internally displaced persons from South Sudan. This figure
has risen since 2013, in part because of the civil war and also because of the persistent and increasingly intense
natural disasters which have uprooted many lives.

______________________________________________________________________________

104

the Africa Center for Strategic Studies March 14, 2017. “Humanitarian Need and Displacement in South
Sudan – Africa Center.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 23 Aug. 2021,
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/humanitarian-need-displacement-south-sudan/.

Climate Change and Violence in South Sudan, 54
How to approach power dynamics in Africa:

Figure 16.
Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz
Figure 17.
The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War, and the Business of Power, by Alex De Waal

______________________________________________________________________________
When analyzing the power dynamics in South Sudan for the fourth and final part of this
study, it is important to discuss the lens used to analyze politics within South Sudan, drawing
upon the political theories of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz in their discussion of a
neopatrimonial political system in Africa Works, and from Alex De Waal’s discussion of a
political marketplace in The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa.
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Politics in South Sudan can be analyzed in a root-like structure. The structure begins with
a certain condition and can then evolve into one branch of the root or another. Essentially, the
argument is based on an analysis of South Sudanese politics that begins with a neopatrimonial
political system which can evolve into a political marketplace. Understanding how politics
function in South Sudan is critical to understanding the nature of violence within the country
because while Neo-PAtrimonial systems are able to avoid violence because of the patron’s
understanding of the regions needs, a political marketplace is essentially violent due to the
economic mismanagement of scarce resources by political leaders.
In Africa Works, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz discuss the existence of a
neopatrimonial system of politics within Africa countries- specifically those located in or near
the Horn of Africa. A neopatrimonial system can be defined as, “the vertical distribution of
resources that gave rise to patron-client networks based around a powerful individual or party.
Once argued to be necessary for unification and development after decolonization, these regimes
have supplanted the role of the inherited colonial institutions for the benefit of a few individuals.
It is significant nowadays because it affects almost all sub-Saharan states to differing degrees and
is not regarded as corrupt behaviour by the population, who rely on the system for their own
survival. Neopatrimonialism affects policy making, especially development projects, and is
responsible for the misuse of aid and state budgets”.105
In their argument, they describe a system of politics that exists behind the facade of
governing institutions that are derived from the West. In other words, a country may appear to be
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governed by a democracy, but behind the curtain of modern, Western style legislative and
executive systems, the country is truly ruled and regulated by a system of patrons and clients,
who exchange goods and services as a means to regulate peace between parties. Politicians and
other groups of influence and power hold private control over desirable resources and services,
which allows them to barter with one another behind the curtain of a mock-democracy. Violence
is generally avoided in a neopatrimonial state because patron politics are able to address regional
issues more effectively than a western-style government which was imposed upon the country
during colonial times. In other words, “patronage politics have managed to “supplant the
legal-rational apparatus” (the adopted bureaucratic institutions) imposed on African nations
during the colonial era. This has given birth to “hybrid” states, where modern formal institutions
exist alongside regimes “based on the giving and granting of favours” and where the
public/private dichotomy in policy decisions and resource distribution becomes hard to
distinguish”.106
The patron-client relationship created in a neopatrimonial system protects the interests of
individuals and communities because the patron understands the needs of the client better than a
imperially-imposed government. The only drawback of these exchanges is that in general, it
mismanages the exchange of resources, and can lead to resource depletion and economic
stagnation due to the lack of predictability between the exchanges of political leaders.
Furthermore, the interference of resource flow in a country can greatly detriment civilians who
depend on the free exchange of those scarce resources. From the outside, this system may seem
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chaotic, but is actually understandable to Africans, as this is the system of governance that builds
on what has existed for centuries within Africa.107
The system of neopatrimonialism is not sustainable given the growing resource scarcity,
as the mishandling of resources and economic stagnation place extreme stress on the
fundamental stability of a country. Eventually, states will be forced to either evolve or devolve
from a neopatrimonial system. For some states, they may evolve into a system of governance
that is more familiar to those of the west. For example, Ghana began as an example of a
neopatrimonial system. However, as stress from the mishandled economy grew, Ghana became
more and more aware of changes that needed to be made in order to prevent total political system
failure. With this in mind, in 1992, Ghana took steps to become a true functioning democracy.
No longer do exchanges happen behind the curtain, and thus far, the system has been successful
in avoiding succumbing to economic instability or resource mismanagement.108
Rwanda is another example of a neopatrimonial system evolving into a regime that no
longer relies on the bartering of goods and services. However, unlike Ghana, Rwanda stabilized
under the rule of Paul Kagame, who has been the “elected” president since 2000. Under his
dictatorship, Rwanda has been able to set aside the exchange and trade of favors for political
power, as Kagame holds absolute rule over the entire political system. The monopoly of power
ceases all competition or ability to rise and fall from power due to personal coffers because what
Kagame says, goes. If a country has a truly powerful dictatorship it cannot be a neopatrimonial
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system, as the need for patronage is minimized. Resources in this system may still be
mismanaged under the dictator, but would not be a function of a lingering neopatrimonial
system, but rather caused by the mismanagement of power by the all powerful singular actor in
charge.109
On the other hand, a neopatrimonial system can also devolve into an even more unstable
system, in which there are ultimately not enough resources left to maintain the balance of power
between the competing economic and political actors. When the actors are not able to be satisfied
by their payments and exchanges, they resort to violence in order to get what they desire. Thus,
the system devolves from a system of balanced exchanges into a system of violent coercion,
extortion, and conflict between people of power who are competing to have their demands
satisfied. This describes the turbulence of the system that De Waal describes as the “political
marketplace” within African politics. De Waal describes that, “The political marketplace is a
contemporary system of governance, characterized by pervasive monetized patronage, in the
form of exchange of political loyalty or cooperation for payment. The countries where this
occurs share three principal features, namely (a) the dominance of interpersonal political
bargaining over formal rules and procedures, (b) pervasive rent-seeking by members of the
political and business elite, and (c) integration into a global patronage order. The political
marketplace is not a transitional or outdated system that is about to be replaced by Weberian
states, but a flexible and dynamic governance order.”110 Importantly, “The central dynamic in the
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political management of a political marketplace is the relationship between the political budget
and the price of loyalty. The political budget refers to the funds available to the ruler for
discretionary spending on ensuring the loyalty of members of the political elite. Its twin concept
is the price of loyalty: the prevailing market rate for ensuring the allegiance or cooperation for a
period of time or a particular activity...The size of the political budget is a function of the rents
that the ruler can obtain (income), and the demands on that fund from members of the political
elite (expenditure). It is the heartbeat of the political marketplace system, and its health is the
indicator of regime survival or crisis”.111
There is no patronage in the political marketplace. Instead, the system relies on buying
the loyalty of other powerful individuals. In De Waal’s argument, these changes in the price of
loyalty to a political figure can be violent, and change often as the prices of political favors,
resources, and money change. Furthermore, unlike a neopatrimonial system, there are no patrons
who use more the facade of a western system of government to properly address regional
populations. The leader in a political marketplace may use a western style of government or a
traditional style, and the leader does not necessarily choose the form of government that is most
familiar to the region. Essentially, as the price of allegiance changes, violence often results.112
In the case of South Sudan, since its independence in 2011, it has always been in a state
of a violent political marketplace. It is possible that when South Sudan was part of Sudan, even
prior to colonization, it was like a neopatrimonial system in that properly balanced power
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between different tribes and groups that lived in the territory (even though it could not have been
defined as neopatrimonial, since the “neo” refers to the fact that the formal or facade aspects of
the government reflect a modern, western state). However, since the colonization of Sudan by the
British, the South of Sudan has been the location of a century of violent altercations, and was
never given the time to settle or to focus on balancing power for the good of regional peace. The
violence continued well into the formation of South Sudan. Even when the republic was formed
with a new constitution, South Sudan still had no opportunity of reverting back into a
neopatrimonial system. All the country had known for generations was violence and systems that
resembled a political marketplace. Thus, it is really no surprise that after the formation of South
Sudan, it fell back into a civil war, as the systems of a political economy still continued even
after the implementation of a republican government. South Sudan was doomed from its birth.
It is important to note that violence within a political marketplace differs from the
ethic-based violence studied in the previous section. Indeed, within South Sudan the Dinka and
Nuer ethnicities play little to no role within the political marketplace, as these independent ethnic
groups do not barter for political influence despite the constant tug of war between Kiir and
Machar in the political marketplace. Rather, the ethnicities side behind political leaders who
partake in the political marketplace as actors, but not necessarily as representatives of an
ethnicity. This makes the ethnic violence distinct from violence that naturally occurs in a
political marketplace. While political marketplace violence is caused by disparities in the cost of
power and influence, the ethnic violence in South Sudan is a function of political loyalty behind
a leader who partakes in the political marketplace (yet these leaders do not barter for power on
behalf of their respective ethnicities). People become loyal to their respective political leader
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because they believe that there are potential advantages partaking in the violence, including
political influence, monetary incentives, and the ability to socially advance. This distinction
becomes important for the argument in the next section, as studying the inherent nature and
causes of the violence is indicative of how precisely climate change influences violence within
South Sudan over time.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Figure 18.113
This graphic shows the forces of competition within a political marketplace.

______________________________________________________________________________
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Climate Change and Violence in South Sudan
In South Sudan, people are not engaging in violent altercations because of climate
change. Increasing average world temperatures and/or changes in rain patterns are not causing
people to fall into violence. The connection between climate change and violence is not as direct
as that. Rather, climate change plays an indirect role in the South Sudanese conflict. Within the
political marketplace it has subtly altered conditions which later spark or intensify outbreaks of
violence. Climate change in this sense should be viewed as a stressor, rather than a direct cause
of violence. As described in the first section, climate change places increased stress on the
security of food, health, shelter, and economy. The increased lack of accessibility combined with
preexisting political and ethnic tensions in South Sudan’s political marketplace has led to an
exacerbation of violence in the region which is unlikely to end, given the hopeless outlook for
both climate change resolution and the deeply rooted predisposition to violence which South
Sudan has had since its birth as a nation.
As mentioned in section 1, insecurity from the decades of war in combination with
increasing climate change, specifically extreme droughts and floods, have threatened South
Sudan’s security of shelter, food and water, health, and economy, with as much as 51% of South
Sudan’s population facing acute food insecurity alone.114 However, section 1 did not address one
other important type of security: political security. Climate change does not directly influence
political security as it does the other four types of security that were analyzed in section 1. A
flood will not destabilize South Sudan’s government. IT will, however, stress the political system
indirectly. For example, floods caused by climate change apply stress on the government which
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is expected to respond in some manner. As politics in South Sudan are directly related to
violence given the nature of the existing political marketplace described in section 3, it follows
that climate change would have a similar indirect influence on violence in South Sudan rather
than a direct influence. Violence does exist within South Sudan without the added stressor of
climate change, and has existed in the territory for decades as seen in section 2. However, due to
the increased damage of climate change to the basic human securities of shelter, food and water,
health, and economy, an increased stress on South Sudan’s already unstable political marketplace
exists. Another factor to add into South Sudan’s political security is the evident ethnic tension
between the Dinka and Nuer people, which is also clearly tied to South Sudan’s politics and has
an indirect relationship with climate change.
For the purpose of this argument, the influence of climate change on the political
marketplace will be viewed separately from climate change’s influence on ethnic violence,
despite the linked nature of the two variables. It will be difficult to untangle the two given the
deeply intertwined ethnic conflict and politics in South Sudan, but isolating the two will be key
to studying different stressors which contribute to exacerbated instances of violence within the
country. Recall from the previous section that while political marketplace violence is caused by
disparities in the cost of power and influence, the ethnic violence in South Sudan is a function of
political loyalty behind a leader who partakes in the political marketplace (Machar and Kiir do
not barter for power on behalf of their respective ethnicities, but rather for their own personal
gain and influence within the political system). Essentially, violence within the political
marketplace is macro in nature, as it involves the violence of the political system, while ethnic
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violence is micro in nature because it involves the study of subgroups which fall under the
system.
Another note to be made prior to isolating and evaluating the extent to which climate
change plays on violence in South Sudan is the lack of data on the nature of violence within
South Sudan. Violence over time needs to be evaluated, and the increasing role of climate
change on violence documented via observational means. There is numerical data on violence
within South Sudan; this paper utilizes data on South Sudan from ACLED, which is a data
source which provides “highest quality and most widely used real-time data and analysis source
on political violence and protest around the world”. While helpful for identifying the isolated
number of events of each type of violence (battles, violence against citizens, riots, explosions,
protests, strategic developments, et cetera), it does not specify the nature of the violence as
“ethnic” or “political”.115 The trends assist in visualizing the increase in violence over time
within South Sudan, which helps suggest that increased stress is being placed upon political and
ethnic tensions, but does not allow us to numerically show causality or calculate the degree to
which climate change influences violence. So, the nature of the argument to follow will be
observational in nature, while being supplemented with the data available on those instances of
violence.
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Figure 19.
This graphic illustrates the outline of my argument for how climate change affects violence in South Sudan by acting
as a stressor.

______________________________________________________________________________

Violence within the Political Marketplace and Climate Change
First, the effect of climate change on violence within the political marketplace will be
evaluated. Recall that this type of violence will be based more in transactions and power
disparities between leaders and actors of political influence within South Sudan.
Climate change does not directly cause violence in South Sudan, it acts as a stressor
which exasperates conditions which lead to violence. Within a political marketplace, climate
change acts as a stressor upon key actors within the system. In other words, climate change
applies stress to one thing, which applies stress to the political leader, which leads them to
violence within the marketplace. Key actors within the political marketplace include anyone who
is actively involved in the bartering and exchange of goods and services as a means to secure
influence over society. Two such actors include the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir
Mayardit, and the Vice President, Riek Machar. While these two men are both hugely significant
rivals within the marketplace, they are not alone. Other actors who vie for political power and
influence the exchange rate of goods and services also include Petronas, which is the company
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that owns the majority of South Sudan’s oil, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (an Anti-Kiir
Political Party formed by refugees in Ethiopia), and the Gold and Consolidated Minerals and
Energy Resource Investment Company Equator Gold, which control the gold mining industries
in South Sudan. While these smaller actors are important to the political marketplace, their
actions are decidedly less violent than those of Machar and Kiir. For this purpose the focus will
be on the violent exchanges between the President and Vice President and how they are tied to
climate change.
The civil war began in 2013, when President Kiir fired Vice President Machar from his
position as Vice president during his coup. Following Kiir’s consolidation of power, the
SPLM-IO was formed in opposition to Kiir and in support of Machar. Violence began between
the two groups, each claiming that their respective leader deserved to sit in the rightful position
of power within the country. Violence spread throughout the country, with people fighting in
organized armies on either the side of Kiir or Machar. Ordinary people joined the violence as a
means of elevating their own societal position, hoping that their respective political leader would
be able to increase their economic standing and personal security, both of which had been
insatiable for decades in the past. For the everyday citizen, Kiir and Machar provided hope to
end the decades of instability in South Sudan. These armies were funded by the SPLM and
SPLM-IO respectively. These two actors in the political marketplace do not agree on the price of
power, as Machar’s rebel group does not believe the benefits provided by Kiir’s rule match the
costs to rule under Kiir. Furthermore, both men profit as the leaders of their own parties. The cost
of being subservient to the other is far smaller than the profit each man makes as the leader of
their own parties, even despite the economic mismanagement, death, and displacement that their
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decisions cost the country as a whole. Thus, violence within the South Sudanese political
marketplace between the two main actors is inevitable and has been continuous since the
beginning of the civil war in 2013.
Violence between the followers of Machar and Kiir followers has increased since 2013 as
the civil war matured. Upon studying the available data on violence in South Sudan since the
beginning of the civil war in 2013, one can notice that the organized violence between the SPLM
and SPLM-IO has intensified and relaxed in accordance with climate change trends. Figure 20
shows a graph which describes data collected in South Sudan on the annual number of violent
altercations within the nation from 2014-2017 In this graph, one can see the obvious peaks of
violence in 2014 and 2017 compared to 2015 and 2016 which comparatively experienced lower
levels of systematic violence between the SPLM and SPLM-IO.116 Figure 21, on the other hand,
shows the relationship between periods of flooding and violence in South Sudan. The year of
2017 in particular stands out because it obviously has some of the highest rates of violence
during an especially intense and prolonged period of flooding in 2017. 2014 also stands out with
very high rates of violence, but is not marked as during an intense flooding period. This is
because during 2014, South Sudan suffered an extreme period of drought, and freshwater was
scarce for populations across the country.117
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The years of 2014 and 2017 may be especially indicative of how climate change
exasperates instances of violence within South Sudan. Though data sets are lacking to calculate
correlation, and four years alone is not nearly enough data to provide a statistically significant
relationship, these observations seem to suggest that periods of extreme natural disaster due to
climate change intensify violent altercations. This could in part be because of how the SPLM and
SPLM-IO are funded and staffed. Both parties and armed wings rely on funds from industries
throughout the country. Environmentally stable years, such as 2015 and 2016 experience less
violence because groups which profit off of the conflict, such as the war industry, and the
political leaders (Kiir and Machar) can comfortably collect funds and pay their own armed forces
and pay off other actors within the political marketplace. When vulnerable natural resources such
as the wood, arable soil, and crop harvests become scarce due to climate change, and output and
profit is subsequently strained, actors within the political marketplace react violently, as they
resort to violent means in order to collect the resources needed to satisfy the market prices of
political power.118 The SPLM and SPLM-IO become more frantic and violent as a result of the
climate change driven disasters which drive resource scarcity which lead to a lack of funds to use
in the political marketplace thus leading to a reliance on violent means to maintain power in the
political marketplace. This is essentially what we see when observing figures 20 and 21, as the
violence increases and decreases in unison with the presence of climate change-driven natural
disasters.
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Figure 20.119
This graphic shows the events of conflict in South Sudan, and the red trendline illustrates the reported fatalities of
each instance over the years.
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Figure 21.120
Precipitation, flooding, and events of Protest and Riots (2013-2019). This Graph shows the relationship between
flooding and periods of conflict.

______________________________________________________________________________

Ethnic Violence in South Sudan and its Relationship with Climate Change
Ethnic violence is one of the byproducts of the Machar versus Kiir feud. However, it is
not the same type of violence as that which occurs in a political marketplace (it does not concern
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the exchange of favors for political power). As such, it shall be studied as a micro byproduct of
the macro Kiir and Machar political rivalry with its own set of climate change-linked stressors.
The civil war began in 2013, when President Kiir fired Vice President Machar from his
position as Vice President during his coup. Following Kiir’s consolidation of power, the
SPLM-IO was formed in opposition to Kiir and in support of Machar. Violence began between
the two groups, each claiming that their respective leader deserved to sit in the rightful position
of power within the country. Violence spread throughout the country, with people fighting on
either the side of Kiir or Machar. Those who sided with Kiir fought on the side of his ethnicity,
the Nuer, while Machar represented the Dinka tribe.
Initially, the violence between the two groups was political in nature, and followed the
orders given by Machar and Kiir. However, as the civil war matured, the ethnic conflict began to
separate itself from the political violence. With time, two ethnic groups began to fight each other
without the directive of their political representatives and fought simply because the other
ethnicity had become their rival and threat to survival. In other words, the ethnic conflict became
less and less political over time and focused more on the disparities between the Nuer and Dinka
people rather than their political orientation, thus excluding the influence of other actors within
the political marketplace and focusing more exclusively on ethnicity.
This evolution of violence is key to understanding the evolution of conflict in South
Sudan. One can think of the change in violence in terms of a metaphorical box. Within the box
are the two big elephants in the room, Kiir and Machar, who are utilizing violence within the
political marketplace in order to rise in power relative to the other. Within the box, they have
utilized ethnic differences between the Nuer and Dinka people in order to progress their own
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political goals. However, ethnic violence can only be forced and manipulated for so long before
it starts to take on a narrative of its own, eventually escaping the confines of the box, beyond the
control of Kiir and Machar. Even if the leaders wanted, their initial “tools' ' of power mongering
had evolved into violence uncontrollable by any politician.
Essentially, the ethnic conflict has become independent of the original issue between Kiir
and Machar. Furthermore, when the “micro” ethnic violence escaped the “macro” box, it also
perpetuated other micro-causes of violence beyond just ethnic tension that are also seen in South
Sudan’s micro violence instances. Examples of other types of micro violence that escaped the
political marketplace include small, independent instances violence based on the violent nature
of a war economy, and psychosocial violence. These smaller conflicts also enabled small
skirmishes between local leaders who were utilizing the violence in an attempt to improve their
own station. The violent actions of local political figures are similar to the violence that occurs
in a large political marketplace, such as that between Kiir and Machar, but on a much smaller
scale.
While the violence perpetuated by the war economy and the small political marketplace
are less potent in nature than the ethnic violence, they still contribute to the medley of
smaller-scale violence that displaces, injures, and kills thousands in South Sudan. In the case of
war economy based violence, all economics is violence and vice versa. Scarcity drives violence,
and everything is fightable. Every resource matters. This is especially important in the context of
climate change, which makes resources scarce. Psychosocial violence on the other hand has
taken root in South Sudan simply because, for decades, violence had become a way of life. All
social exchanges and mannerisms have essentially been tainted by a long history that is rooted in
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communication via violence. There are few small political actors who escape the confines of the
macro box, engaging in their own small transactions and negotiations for power on a local scale.
Conflict between the Nuer and Dinka is not a new development, as territorial skirmishes
over grazing land for their pastoral lifestyles were common even before the 2013 civil war.
While the previous conflicts between the two ethnic groups were not large in scale, they were
sufficient enough to create a sort of psycho-social hatred, which had deep roots in historical
conflicts between the Nuer and Dinka. The preexistence of these sentiments primed the two
ethnic groups for increased violence when Machar and Kiir began their violent altercations over
political power.
The political actions of Machar and Kiir were “power grab” in nature, but the division of
fighters and support within the SPLM and SPLM-IO divisions fell along ethnic lines. Those in
the SPLM who supported Kiir were mainly Nuer and the SPLM-IO was mainly Dinka in
ethnicity, like Machar. Violence eventually transcended the framework of a political conflict
when the Dinka and Nuer began violent altercations with each other outside of political
directives; the two groups began to engage the other violently, originally based on rekindled
hatred for the other ethnicity due to scarcity and political affiliation. But as mentioned before, the
ethnic violence escaped the box, becoming a conflict that is not necessarily political in nature.
The Nuer and Dinka have economic and political reasons to fight now, independent of their
original patrons. Climate change plays into that - for example, as herders need to move further
out with their herds for new grazeable land, they encroach on historic territorial borders
belonging to rival agriculturalists. Essentially, the existing ethnic hatreds between the two groups
were exasperated due to the civil war in 2013.
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The conflict changed from political in nature to ethnic in nature when the SPLM and
SPLM-IO armies began to indiscriminately kill civilians of the opposing ethnicity rather than
containing fighting to a purely political army versus army scenario. The first purely ethnic
conflicts began with violence against a few civilians of the opposing ethnicity, individuals who
were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Those instances began to grow in scale and intensity,
however, as the two groups attacked entire villages. In particular, fighting was focused on
disputed grazing lands between the two groups, each claiming that the land was within their
pastoral territory.
In particular, instances of violence instigated by the Nuer against the Dinka increased
over time, predominantly in areas of disputed territory. Looking at Figure 21 below, one can see
that historic Nuer territory encompasses the majority of land surrounding the Nile river as it
flows into the country (most is part of the state of Jonglei).121 The state of Jonglei was
historically popular due to its extremely arable soil which surrounded the river, thus giving it the
largest population compared to other South Sudanese States, even despite not having any
prominent cities of its own(see figure 22).122 However, since 2013, Jonglei has experienced
terrible periods of flooding which have only intensified over time as climate change intensifies
the wet season and flooding from the Nile River. As many as 370 thousand people in Jonglei are
extremely impacted by the floods (see figure 23).123 As mentioned in Section 1, the increasingly
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severe flooding greatly impacts the shelter, food and water, health, and economic security of
individuals within South Sudan. The intense floods also damaged the natural grazing lands of
Jonglei, forcing the native Nuer people living there to look elsewhere to graze their herds, find
new homes, and seek freshwater stores, specifically towards Dinka grazing land which is not as
affected by the increasingly detrimental wet seasons. Thus, the Nuer have instigated more and
more skirmishes along Jonglei’s border (see figure 25 and 26).124 In 2013, approximately
383,000 people were internally displaced from Jonglei due to flooding. By 2019, approximately
1,352,000 people had been displaced due to flooding.125 The increased displacement due to
flooding in Jonglei was caused in part due to the increased intensity and frequency of the floods,
but also by the fallen resilience of families and communities that live there. After so many cycles
of increased flooding, the health, economic, food, and shelter costs of living there outweigh the
benefits of living close to a fertile river.
In 2013, there were 375 recorded instances of violence in Jonglei with an estimated 4.363
fatalities.126 As of December 31, 2019, there were 521 instances of violence recorded within the
year (account of fatalities unavailable for 2019).127 Due to the increase in violence within the
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state in conjunction with the ever intensifying natural disasters, Jonglei experienced the largest
number of internally displaced people (as seen in figure 24 ).128
The case of Jonglei’s conflict provides valuable insight on the nature of the violence
occurring in the region. It is likely the displacement of people due to flooding in Jonglei is
closely correlated to the violence that ensued between the Nuer and Dinka people as competition
for grazeable and farmable lands intensified. Data sets are needed to help prove correlation
between the two variables, however it seems that the ethnic conflict in Jonglei is largely driven
by displacement due to increased severity of climate change related disasters.
______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 22.129
This map shows the historic territories of the Dinka and Nuer peoples.
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Figure 23.130
This OCHA map shows the total population of each of South Sudan’s 10 states.
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Figure 24.131
This graphic shows the number of internally displaced people based on each of South Sudan’s states.
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Figure 25.132
Mapping Internally Displaced People in Each State.
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Figure 26.133
This figure maps the location of violent conflicts in South Sudan.
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Figure 27.134
This graph from ACLED shows increases in violence over time in South Sudan. Note that it increases beginning in
2013, when the civil war began, and increased a lot as climate change placed increased stress on violence both
within and outside of the metaphorical box.
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Conclusion
In South Sudan, people are not engaging in violent altercations because of climate
change. Rather, climate change plays a non-direct role in South Sudanese conflict. Within the
political marketplace it has subtly altered conditions which later spark or intensify outbreaks of
violence. Climate change in this sense should be viewed as a stressor of sorts rather than a direct
cause of violence. As described in the first section, climate change places increased stress on the
security of food, health, shelter, and economy. The increased lack of accessibility combined with
the preexisting political and ethnic tensions which exist in South Sudan’s political marketplace,
as enumerated in section 2 and 3, have led to an exacerbation of violence in the region which is
unlikely to end any time, given the lack of solutions or action to address both climate change as
well as the deeply rooted predisposition to violence which South Sudan has had since its birth as
a nation.
The observed case studies in section 4 describe how violence is exasperated in the
political marketplace and between ethnicities demonstrates the existence of a sizable indirect link
between climate change and the increases in violent altercations within South Sudan. In the
future, improved data sets should be able to provide a numerical value to the observations being
made in this study, and will be able to shed light on the strength of this association.
The future of South Sudan seems grim, for as climate change continues to worsen due to
anthropogenic causes, it is likely that instances of extreme weather and natural disaster will also
increase in this area, thus leading to an increase in violence within the country. As of now,
climate change policies have been slow to be enforced, and many countries and industries around
the world continue to ignore international agreements towards alleviating and helping reverse
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climate change. Though South Sudan is not a huge contributor to anthropogenic climate change,
it is still affected by the negative decisions of other countries, and it experiences
disproportionate consequences of harmful emissions compared to other countries which are
larger polluters yet suffer less in the way of natural disasters.
Furthermore, even if climate change were alleviated, given the current model of a
political marketplace in South Sudan, it is still very likely that violence between Machar and Kiir
and the Nuer and Dinka would continue, as the country has never experienced a non-political
marketplace system of government. Without international intervention or a seemingly miraculous
lasting peace agreement between the SPLM and SPLM-IO, it is unlikely that power dynamics
within South Sudan will evolve into a neopatrimonial system or a true democracy. It is possible
that one side of the conflict could decisively win; however, that would require the complete
control of opposing forces, which are large, and control over protests to a decisive win.
Corruption, and a social, political, and economic reliance on violence, seem to be too strong to
allow South Sudan to throw off the yolk of the political marketplace, which is linked into the
minds and experiences of all who live there.
Knowing that the positive ties between violence and climate change likely exist, there is
an increased motive for international organizations to step up if there is a desire to bring peace
to the area through international intervention and assistance. Perhaps someday in the future
South Sudan will be able to transcend its violent roots and become something more. Until then,
people will inevitably be displaced, injured, and killed due to the lethal combination of
intensifying natural disasters, ethnic violence, and vicious political competition within South
Sudan.
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